Big data is one of the cornerstones to enabling and training deep neural networks (DNNs). Because of the lack of expertise, to gain benefits from their data, average users have to rely on and upload their private data to big data companies they may not trust. Due to the compliance, legal, or privacy constraints, most users are willing to contribute only their encrypted data, and lack interests or resources to join the training of DNNs in cloud. To train a DNN on encrypted data in a completely non-interactive way, a recent work proposes a fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)-based technique implementing all activations in the neural network by Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan (BGV)-based lookup tables. However, such inefficient lookup-table-based activations significantly prolong the training latency of privacypreserving DNNs.
Introduction
Deep learning is one of the most dominant approaches to solving a wide variety of problems such as recommender systems, computer vision and natural language processing [12] , because it has demonstrated state-of-the-art accuracy. Through only sufficient labeled data, the weights of a deep learning model can be trained to achieve high enough accuracy. Average users typically lack knowledge and expertise to build their own deep learning models to harvest benefits from their own data, so they have to depend on big data companies such as Google, Amazon and Microsoft. However, due to compliance, legal, and privacy constraints, there are many scenarios where the data required by the training of DNNs is extremely sensitive. It is risky to provide personal information, e.g., financial or healthcare records, to untrusted companies to train deep learning models. Federal privacy regulations such as the EU general data protection regulation also restrict the availability and sharing of these sensitive data.
Recent works [22, 1, 15] propose several cryptographic techniques to enable the privacy-preserving training of deep learning models. Private federated learning [15] is created to decentralize the training of deep learning models and enable users to train with their own data locally. QUOTIENT [1] takes advantage of multi-party computation (MPC) to interactively train deep learning models on both the server and the user. Both federated learning and MPC require users to stay online and heavily participate in the DNN training. However, in some cases, average users may not have strong interest, powerful hardware, or fast network connections for interactive DNN trainings [17] . To enable the private training of DNNs on encrypted data in a completely non-interactive way, a recent study presents the first fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)-based stochastic gradient descent technique [22] , FHESGD. During FH-ESGD, a user first encrypts the private data and uploads the encrypted data to an untrusted server that performs both forward and backward propagations on the encrypted data without decryption. After uploading encrypted data, the users can simply go offline. The user privacy is preserved in the training procedure, since the input and output data, activations, losses and gradients are all encrypted. However, FHESGD [22] is seriously limited by its long training latency, because of its BGV-lookup-table-based sigmoid activations. Specifically, FHESGD builds a Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) with 3 layers to achieve < 98% test accuracy on the encrypted MNIST dataset after 50 training epochs. A mini-batch including 60 samples takes ∼ 2 hours on a 16-core CPU. FHESGD uses the BGV cryptosystem [14] to implement the stochastic gradient descent algorithm, because BGV is good at performing large vectorial arithmetic operations frequently used in the MLP. However, FHESGD replaces all activations of the MLP by sigmoid functions, and uses BGV homomorphic table lookup operations [2] to implement the sigmoid function. A BGV homomorphic table lookup operation in the FHESGD setting is so slow that the BGV-lookup-table-based sigmoid activations consume ∼ 98% of the training time.
In this paper, we propose a FHE-based DNN called Glyph to enable fast and accurate training over encrypted data. Our contributions can be summarized as:
• We propose a FHE-based DNN training scheme, Glyph, to adopt the logic-operation-friendly TFHE cryptosystem [8] to implement activations such as ReLU and softmax in DNN trainings. The TFHE-based activations significantly reduce the activation latency. • We propose a cryptosystem switching technique to enable Glyph to perform activations by TFHE and switch to the vectorial-arithmetic-friendly BGV cryptosystem when processing fully-connected and convolutional layers. By switching between TFHE and BGV, Glyph can substantially improve the privacy-preserving DNN training speed on encrypted data. • At last, we apply the method of transfer learning on Glyph to not only reduce the computing overhead of DNN trainings, but also improve its test accuracy. Compared to FHESGD, Glyph reduces the training latency by 99% and improves the test accuracy by 1 ∼ 2% on various encrypted datasets.
Background

Threat Model
Although an encryption scheme protects the data sent to external servers, untrusted servers [12] can make data leakage happen. Homomorphic Encryption is one of the most promising techniques to enable a server to perform private DNN training [22] on encrypted data. A user sends encrypted data to a server performing private DNN trainings on encrypted data. More importantly, after uploading encrypted data to the server, the user can go offline without participating time-consuming DNN trainings.
Fully Homomorphic Encryption
A cryptosystem that supports computation on ciphertexts without decryption is known as homomorphic encryption(HE) [9] . HE cryptosystem encrypts the plaintext p to the ciphertext c by a function . We have c = (p, k pub ), where k pub is the public key. Another function σ decrypts the ciphertext c back to the plaintext p. We have p = σ(c, k pri ), where k pri is the private key. The cryptosystem is homomorphic in an operation , if there is another operation • such that (x, k pub ) • (y, k pub ) = (x y, k pub ), where x and y are two plaintext operands. Modern HE cryptosystems have two modes: leveled HE and fully HE (FHE). Each HE operation introduces noise into the ciphertext. Leveled HE allows to compute HE functions of only a maximal degree by designing a set of parameters. Beyond its maximal degree, leveled HE cannot correctly decrypt the ciphertext, because the accumulated noise is too large. On the contrary, FHE can enable an unlimited number of HE operations on the ciphertext, since it uses bootstrapping [14, 8] to "refresh" the ciphertext and reduce its noise. However, a bootstrapping operation is computationally expensive and hence time-consuming. Because the privacy-preserving DNN training requires an impractically large maximal degree, it is impossible to train a DNN by leveled HE cryptosystems. A recent work [22] demonstrates the feasibility of using the FHE BGV cryptosystem to implement DNN training on encrypted data.
BGV and TFHE
Based on the Ring-LWE (Learning With Errors) problem, several FHE cryptosystems [8, 14] , e.g., TFHE [8] , BFV [6] , BGV [14] , HEAAN [7] , have been developed. Each FHE cryptosystem can more efficiently process a specific type of homomorphic operations. For instance, TFHE [8] runs combinatorial operations on individual slots faster. BFV [6] is good at performing large vectorial arithmetic operations. Similar to BFV, BGV [8] manipulates elements in large cyclotomic rings, modulo integers with many hundreds of bits. However, BGV has less scaling operations, and thus processes vectorial multiplications of ciphertexts faster [18, 10] . At last, HEAAN [7] supports floating point computations more efficiently. A recent work [3] demonstrates the feasibility of combining and switching between three Ring-LWE-based FHE cryptosystems including TFHE, BFV and HEAAN via homomorphic operations.
Forward and Backward Propagation
The training of a DNN includes forward propagation and backward propagation. During forward propagation, as Figure 1 shows, the input data go through the layers consecutively in the forward direction. The forward propagation can be described as
, where u l is the neuron tensor of layer l; d l−1 is the output of layer l − 1 and the input of layer l; W l is the weight tensor of layer l; b l−1 is the bias tensor of layer l − 1; and f () is the forward activation function. We use y and t to indicate the output of a neural network and the standard label, respectively. An L 2 norm loss function is defined as E(W, b) = 1 2 ||y − t|| 2 2 . The backward propagation can be 
, where δ l is the error of layer l and defined as ∂E ∂b l ; f'() is the backward activation function; ∇W l and ∇b l are weight and bias gradients, respectively.
Motivation
The BGV-based FHESGD [22] trains a 3-layer MLP by substituting all activations with sigmoid, and implements sigmoid by a lookup table. However, the lookup-tablebased sigmoid significantly increases the mini-batch training latency of FHESGD. As Figure 2 shows, with an increasing bitwidth of each entry of the BGV-based sigmoid lookup table, the test accuracy of FHESGD greatly improves and is approaching 98%, but its activation processing time, i.e., the sigmoid table lookup latency, also significantly increases and eventually occupies > 98% of the mini-batch training latency.
It is possible to fast and accurately implement the homomorphic activations including ReLU and softmax of private training by TFHE, since the TFHE cryptosystem processes combinatorial operations on individual slots more efficiently. Table 1 compares the latencies of various homomorphic operations implemented by BGV, BFV and TFHE. Compared to BGV, TFHE shortens the table lookup latency by ∼ 100×, and thus can implement fast activation functions. However, after we implemented the privacypreserving DNN training by TFHE, as Figure 3 exhibits, we found although the homomorphic activations take much less time, the mini-batch training latency substantially increases, because of the slow homomorphic MAC operations implemented by TFHE. Compared to TFHE, BGV [8] demonstrates 17× ∼ 30× shorter latencies for a variety of vectorial arithmetic operations such as the multiplication between a ciphertext and a ciphertext (MultCC), the multiplication between a ciphertext and a plaintext (MultCP), and the addition between a ciphertext and a ciphertext (Ad-dCC). If we implement activation operations by TFHE, and compute vectorial MAC operations by BGV, the privacypreserving DNN training can obtain both high test accuracy and short training latency simultaneously.
Although a recent work [3] proposes a cryptosystem switching technique to homomorphically switch between TFHE and BFV, we argue that compared to BFV, the BGV cryptosystem can implement faster privacypreserving DNN training. First, as Table 1 shows, BGV computes multiplications between ciphertexts and plaintexts faster than BFV, because it has less scaling operations [18, 10] . Second, the state-of-the-art implementation of BFV, Microsoft SEAL [24] , does not support bootstrapping. Therefore, we cannot adopt BFV for FHE-based privacy-preserving DNN training. In this paper, we propose a new cryptosystem technique to enable the homomorphic switching between BGV and TFHE.
Related Work
A flurry of prior works use various FHE cryptosystems including TFHE [4] and BGV [16] to implement leveled-HE-enabled privacy-preserving DNN inferences, where only the input, output data and activations are encrypted but the pre-trained weights are unencrypted. Compared to inferences, the fully-HE-enabled privacy-preserving DNN training is more computationally expensive, since it needs to compute the errors and gradients. Moreover, the inputs, activations and weights are all encrypted during the privacypreserving DNN training. The first fully-HE-enabled DNN training technique [22] relies on the vectorial-arithmeticfriendly BGV cryptosystem.
Besides fully HE, recent works adopt multi-party computation [1] and private federated learning [15] to enable the privacy-preserving training of DNNs. Both schemes heavily involve users in the hardware-resource-demanding privacy-preserving DNN training. However, average users may not have strong motivation or powerful computing hardware to join the privacy-preserving DNN training. In this paper, we propose a fully-HE-based privacy-preserving DNN training technique that requires users to only upload their encrypted data.
Glyph
TFHE-based Activations
To accurately train a FHE-based DNN, we propose TFHE-based homomorphic ReLU and softmax activation units. We construct a ReLU unit by TFHE homomorphic gates with bootstrapping, and build a softmax unit by TFHE homomorphic multiplexers.
ReLU: The forward ReLU of the i th neuron in the layer l can be summarized as
, where µ l [i] is the i th neuron in the layer l. The backward iReLU for the i th neuron in the layer l can be described as
, where δ l [i] is the i th error of layer l. Our TFHE-based forward ReLU unit can be implemented as Algorithm 1, where we first set the most significant bit of
can be always non-negative. We then get the negation of the most significant bit of u l [i], u l [i][n − 1], by a TFHE homomorphic NOT gate that even does not require bootstrapping [9] .
An n-bit forward ReLU unit requires 1 TFHE NOT gate without bootstrapping and n − 2 TFHE AND gates with bootstrapping.
In contrast, the backward iReLU takes the i th error of layer l, δ l [i], and the most significant bit of u l [i], u l [i][n − 1] as inputs. It generates the i th error of layer l − 1, δ l−1 [i]. Our TFHE-based backward iReLU unit can be built by Algorithm 2, where we first compute the negation of the most
An n-bit backward iReLU unit requires 1 TFHE NOT gate without bootstrapping and n − 1 TFHE AND gates with bootstrapping. Our TFHE-based forward or backward ReLU function takes only 0.1 second, while the BGVlookup-table-based activation consumes 307.9 seconds on our CPU baseline. Softmax: softmax takes n u l [i] as its input and normalizes them into a probability distribution consisting of n probabilities proportional to the exponentials of the inputs. The softmax activation can be described as
We use TFHE homomorphic multiplexers to implement a softmax unit shown in Figure 4 , where we have 8 entries denoted as S 0 ∼ S 7 for a 3-bit TFHE-lookup-table-based softmax unit and each entry has 3-bit. The i th neuron u l [i] is used to look up one of the eight entries, and the output is d l [i]. There are two TFHE gates with bootstrapping on the critical path of each TFHE homomorphic multiplexer. An n-bit softmax unit requires 2 n TFHE gates with bootstrapping. Compared to BGV-lookup-table-based softmax, our TFHE-based softmax unit reduces the activation latency from 307.9 seconds to only 3.3 seconds. To efficiently back-propagate the loss of softmax, FHESGD [22] uses a quadratic loss function to reduce the computing overhead of logarithmic operations in a cross-entropy loss function.
Our experimental results show the quadratic loss function achieves the same test accuracy but costs much less computing overhead. So in this paper we also adopt the derivative of quadratic loss function described as
, where t[i] is the i th ground truth. The quadratic loss function requires only homomorphic multiplications and additions. Although it is feasible to implement the quadratic loss function by TFHE, when considering the switching overhead from BGV to TFHE, we use BGV to implement the quadratic loss function.
Pooling. It is faster to adopt TFHE to implement max pooling operations. But considering the switching overhead from BGV to TFHE, we adopt BGV to implement average pooling operations requiring only homomorphic additions and multiplications.
The Switching between BGV and TFHE
BGV can efficiently process vectorized arithmetic operations, while TFHE runs logic operations faster. During the training of Glyph, we plan to use BGV for convolutional, fully-connected, average pooling, and batch normalization layers, and adopt TFHE for activation operations. To use both BGV and TFHE, we propose a cryptosystem switching technique switching Glyph between BGV and TFHE cryptosystems.
Both BGV and TFHE are built upon the the Ring-LWE problem [8, 14] , but they cannot naïvely switch between each other. Because BGV and TFHE work on different plaintext spaces. The plaintext space of BGV is the ring R p = Z[X]/(X N + 1) mod p r , where p is a prime and r is an integer. We denote the BGV plaintext space as Z N [X] mod p r . TFHE has three plaintext spaces [9] including TLWE, TRLWE and TRGSW. TLWE encodes individual continuous plaintexts over the torus T = R/Z mod 1. TRLWE encodes continuous plaintexts over R[X] mod (X N + 1) mod 1. We denote the TRLWE plaintext space as T N [X] mod 1, which can be viewed as the packing of N individual coefficients. TRGSW encodes integer polynomials in Z N [X] with bounded norm. Through key-switching, TFHE can switch between these three plaintext spaces. Our cryptosystem switching scheme maps the plaintext spaces of BGV and TFHE to a common algebraic structure using natural algebraic homomorphisms. The cryptosystem switching can then happen in the common algebraic structure. Our cryptosystem can enable Glyph to use both TFHE and BGV cryptosystems by homomorphically switching between different plaintext spaces, as shown in Figure 5 .
• From BGV to TFHE. The switch from BGV to TFHE homomorphically transforms the ciphertext of N BGV slots encrypting N plaintexts over Z N [X] mod p r to K TLWE-mode TFHE ciphertexts, each of which encrypts plaintexts over T = R/Z mod 1. The switch from BGV to TFHE includes three steps. Based on Lemma 1 in [3] , Z N [X] mod p r homomorphically multiplying p −r is a Z N [X]-module isomorphism from R p = Z N [X] mod p r to the submodule of T N [X] generated by p −r . Via multiplying p −r , we can convert integer coefficients in the plaintext space of BGV into a subset of torus T consisting of multiples of p −r . In this way, we extract N coefficients from the BGV plaintexts over Z N [X] mod p r to form T N . Based on Theorem 2 in [3] , we use the functional key-switching to homomorphically convert T N into T N [X], which is the plaintext space of the TRLWE-mode of TFHE. We adopt the SampleExtract function [3] of TFHE to homomorphically achieve K individual TLWE ciphertexts from T N [X]. Given a TRLWE ciphertext c of a plaintext µ, SampleExtract(c) extracts from c the TLWE sample that encrypts the i th coefficient µ i with at most the same noise variance or amplitude as c. • From TFHE to BGV. The switch from TFHE to BGV is to homomorphically transform K TFHE ciphertexts in the TLWE-mode (m 0 , m 1 , . . . , m K−1 ) in T K to a BGV N -slot ciphertext whose plaintexts are over Z N [X] mod p r . Based on Theorem 3 in [3] , we can use the functional gate bootstrapping of TFHE to restrict the plaintext space of TFHE in the TLWE-mode to an integer domain Z K pr consisting of multiples of p −r . The plaintext space transformation from Z K pr to Z N p r is a Z N [X]-module isomorphism, so we also can use the key-switching to implement it. At last, we can use the SampleExtract function of TFHE to homomorphically obtain the BGV N -slot ciphertext whose plaintexts are over Z N [X] mod p r .
Transfer Learning for Private DNN Training
Although FHESGD [22] shows that it is feasible to homomorphically train a 3-layer MLP, it is still very challenging to homomorphically train a deep convolutional neural network (CNN), because of the huge computing overhead of homomorphic convolutions. We propose to use transfer learning to reduce the computing overhead of homomorphic convolutions in privacy-preserving CNN trainings. Although several prior works [5, 21] adopt transfer learning in privacy-preserving inferences, to our best knowledge, this is the first work to use transfer learning in privacy-preserving CNN trainings.
Transfer learning [28, 23, 13] can be used to reuse knowledge among different datasets in the same CNN architecture, since the first several convolutional layers of the CNN extracts general features independent of datasets. Applying transfer learning in privacy-preserving CNN trainings brings two benefits. First, transfer learning reduces the number of trainable layers, i.e., the weights in the convolutional layers are fixed, so that the training latency can be greatly reduced. Second, we can convert computationally expensive convolutions between ciphertext and ciphertext to cheaper convolutions between ciphertext and plaintext, because the fixed weights in the convolutional layers are not updated by encrypted weight gradients. Moreover, transfer learning does not hurt the security of the FHE-based DNN training, since the input, activations, losses and gradients are still encrypted. Figure 6 : An example of transfer learning in the privacypreserving CNN training.
We show an example of applying transfer learning in the privacy-preserving CNN training in Figure 6 . We reuse the first two convolutional layers trained by unencrypted CIFAR-10, discard the last two fully-connected layers, and add two randomly initialized fully-connected layers, when homomorphically training of the same CNN architecture on an encrypted skin cancer dataset [26] . During the privacypreserving training on the skin cancer dataset, we update the weights only in the last two fully-connected layers. In this way, the privacy-preserving model can reuse the general features learned from public unencrypted datasets. Meanwhile, in the privacy-preserving training, the computations on the first several convolutional and batch normalization layers are computationally cheap, since their weights are fixed and unencrypted.
Experimental Methodology
The Setting of Cryptosystems
For BGV, we used the same parameter setting rule as [11] , and the HElib [2] library to implement all related algorithms. We adopted the m th cyclotomic ring with m = 2 10 − 1, corresponding to lattices of dimension ψ(m) = 600. This native plaintext space has 60 plaintext slots which can pack 60 input ciphertexts. The BGV setting parameters yield a security level of > 80 bits. Both BGV and TFHE implement bootstrapping operations and support fully homomorphic encryption. We set the parameters of TFHE to the same security level as BGV, and used the TFHE [9] library to implement all related algorithms. TFHE is a three-level scheme. For first-level TLWE, we set the minimal noise standard variation to α = 6.10 · 10 −5 and the count of coefficients to n = 280 to achieve the security level of λ = 80. The second level TRLWE configures the minimal noise standard variation to α = 3.29 · 10 −10 , the count of coefficients to n = 800, and the security degree to λ = 128. The third-level TRGSW sets the minimal noise standard variation to α = 1.42 · 10 −10 , the count of coefficients to n = 1024, the security degree to λ = 156. We adopted the same key-switching and extract-sample parameters of TFHE as [3] .
Simulation, Dataset and Network Architecture
We evaluated all schemes on an Intel Xeon E7-8890 v4 2.2GHz CPU with 256GB DRAM. It has two sockets, each of which owns 12 cores and supports 24 threads. Our encrypted datasets include MNIST [20] and Skin-Cancer-MNIST [26] . Skin-Cancer-MNIST consists of 10015 dermatoscopic images and includes a representative collection of 7 important diagnostic categories in the realm of pigmented lesions. We grouped it into a 8K training dataset and a 2K test dataset. We also used SVHN [25] and CIFAR-10 [19] to pre-train our models which are for transfer learning on encrypted datasets. We adopted two network architectures, a 3-layer MLP [22] and a 4-layer CNN shown in Figure 6 . The 3-layer MLP has a 28 × 28 input layer, a 128-neuron hidden layer and a 32-neuron hidden layer. The CNN includes two convolutional layers, two batch normalization layers, two pooling layers, three ReLU layers and two fully-connected layers. The CNN architectures are different for MNIST and Skin-Cancer-MNIST. For MNIST, the input size is 28 × 28. There are 6 × 3 × 3 and 16 × 3 × 3 weight kernels, respectively, in two convolutional layers. Two fully connected layers have 84 neurons and 10 neurons respectively. For Skin-Cancer-MNIST, the input size is 28×28×3. There are 64×3×3×3 and 96×64×3×3 weight kernels in two convolutional layers, respectively. Two fullyconnected layers are 128 neurons and 7 neurons, respectively. We quantized the inputs, weights and activations of two network architectures with 8-bit by the training quantization technique in SWALP [27] . 6 . Results and Analysis 6.1. MNIST FHESGD. The mini-batch training latency breakdown of a 3-layer FHESGD-based MLP [22] on a single CPU core is shown in Table 2 . During a mini-batch, the MLP is trained with 60 MNIST images. Each BGV lookup-table operation consumes 307.9 seconds, while a single BGV MAC operation costs only 0.012 seconds. Although the activation layers of FHESGD require only a small number of BGV lookup-table operations, they consumes 98% of the total training latency. The FHESGD-based MLP makes all homomorphic multiplications happen between ciphertext and ciphertext, though the homomorphic multiplications between ciphertext and plaintext is computationally cheaper. The total training latency of the 3-layer FHESGDbased MLP for a mini-batch is 118K seconds, which is about 1.35 days [22] . TFHE Activation and Cryptosystem Switching. We replace all activations of the 3-layer FHESGD-based MLP by our TFHE-based ReLU and softmax activations, and build it as the Glyph-based MLP. We also integrate the cryptosystem switchings into the Glyph-based MLP to perform homomorphic MAC operations by BGV, and conduct activations by TFHE. The mini-batch training latency break-down of the 3-layer Glyph-based MLP on a single CPU core is shown in Table 3 . Because of the logic-operation-friendly TFHE, the processing latency of activation layers of Glyph significantly decreases. The cryptosystem switchings introduce only small computing overhead. For instance, compared to the counterpart in the FHESGD-based MLP, FC1forward increases the processing latency by only 0.96%, due to the cryptosystem switching overhead. Because of fast activations, compared to the FHESGD-based MLP, our Glyph-based MLP reduces the mini-batch training latency by 97.4% but maintains the same test accuracy.
Transfer Learning on CNN. We use our TFHE-based activations and cryptosystem switching technique to build a Glyph-based CNN, whose detailed architecture is explained in Section 5.2. We implement transfer learning in the Glyph-based CNN by fixing the convolutional layers trained by SVHN and training only two fully-connected layers. The mini-batch training latency breakdown of the Glyph-based CNN with transfer learning on a single CPU core is shown in Table 4 . Because the weights of the convolutional layers are unencrypted and fixed, our Glyph-based CNN significantly reduces the number of multiplications between ciphertext and ciphertext (MultCC), and adds only computationally cheap multiplications between ciphertext and plaintext (MultCP). The Glyph-based CNN decreases the training latency by 56.7%, but improves the test accuracy by ∼2% over the Glyph-based MLP. Test Accuracy. The test accuracy comparison of the FHESGD-based MLP and the Glyph-based CNN is shown in Figure 7 , where all networks are trained in the plaintext domain. It takes 5 epochs for the FHESGD-based MLP to reach 96.4% test accuracy on MNIST. After 
Skin-Cancer-MNIST
We built the Glyph-based MLP and CNN architectures for Skin-Cancer-MNIST by our TFHE-based activations, cryptosystem switching and transfer learning. Since the network on Skin-Cancer-MNIST (Cancer) is larger than MNIST, the training latency is the larger as the Table 5 shows. The mini-batch training latency changes on Skin-Cancer-MNIST are similar to those on MNIST. The test accuracy comparison of the FHESGD-based MLP and the Glyph-based CNN is shown in Figure 8 . For transferring learning, we first train the Glyph-based CNN with CIFAR-10, fix its convolutional layers, and then train its fully-connected layers with Skin-Cancer-MNIST. On such a more complex dataset, compared to the FHESGD-based MLP, the Glyph-based CNN without transferring learning increases the training accuracy by 2% at the 15 th epoch. The transferring learning further improves the test accuracy of the Glyph-based CNN to 73.2%, i.e., a 4% test accuracy boost. Our TFHE-based activations, cryptosystem switch-ing and transfer learning makes Glyph efficiently support deep CNN architecture. 
Overall Training Latency and Scalability
The overall training latency of multiple threads on our CPU baseline is shown in Table 5 . We measured the minibatch training latency by running various FHE-based training for a mini-batch. We estimated the total training latency via the product of the mini-batch training latency and the total mini-batch number for a training. For MNIST, the FHESGD-based MLP requires 50 epochs, each of which includes 1000 mini-batches (60 images), to obtain 97.8% test accuracy. On a single CPU core, the training of the FHESGD-based MLP needs 187-year, which is impractical. On the contrary, our Glyph-based CNN requires only 5 epochs to achieve 98.6% test accuracy. The training of the Glyph-based CNN needs 2.46 months. If we use 48 threads to train the Glyph-based CNN, the overall training latency can be reduced to 8 days. Multi-threading can effectively increase the training parallelism, since the weight updates in Stochastic Gradient Decent (SGD) are independent. With 48 threads, we observed a 9.3× training speedup, because the memory bandwidth has become the performance scaling bottleneck. For Skin-Cancer-MNIST, it takes 30 epochs, each of which includes 134 mini-batches, for the FHESGD-based MLP to achieve 70.2% test accuracy. In contrast, our Glyph-based CNN requires only 15 epochs to obtain 73.2% test accuracy. By 48 threads, the training of the Glyph-based CNN can be completed within 7 days.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose, Glyph, a FHE-based privacypreserving technique to fast and accurately train DNNs on encrypted data. Glyph performs ReLU and softmax by logic-operation-friendly TFHE, while conducts MAC operations by vectorial-arithmetic-friendly BGV. We create a cryptosystem switching technique to switch Glyph between TFHE and BGV. We further apply the method of transfer learning on Glyph to support CNN architectures and reduce the number of homomorphic multiplications between ciphertext and ciphertext. Our experimental results show Glyph obtains the state-of-the-art test accuracy, but reduces the training latency by 99% over the prior FHE-based technique on multiple encrypted datasets.
